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GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN ATHLETICS
CHERYL L. SCHUBERT-MADSEN,*
ARLINE F. SCHUBERT,** and
GEORGE W. SCHUBERT***
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, men and women have been separated in many
activities based merely upon their gender differences. However,
on December 14, 1961, Executive Order No. 10980 was issued by
President John F. Kennedy, establishing the President's Commis-
sion on the Status of Women. Based upon that organization's find-
ings, task force findings, and congressional hearings, it was evident
that gender discrimination in the United States was rampant.' It
became apparent to all three branches of government that no indi-
vidual branch had the ability to solve the problem of gender dis-
crimination without the cooperation of the other two.
While Congress has enacted numerous laws protecting indi-
viduals from gender discrimination,2 and the executive branch has
established the President's Commission on the Status of Women
and the President's Task Force on Women's Rights and Responsi-
bilities to fully investigate the matter, the judiciary has probably
been the most active in defining the boundaries of gender discrim-
ination. Gender discrimination cases have arisen under numerous
statutes and the United States Constitution. In amateur athletics
most cases interpreting gender discrimination legislation involve
petitioners' arguments that base their claims on the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution and Title IX.3
This article will discuss the primary legal theories that are
J.D. University of North Dakota; Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, Northeastern
Oklahoma State University, Tahlequah, Oklahoma.
** J.D. University 6f North Dakota; M.S. University of North Dakota, University
Counsel, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota.
*** Ph.D. University of North Dakota; M.S. University of Wisconsin; Dean, and Faculty
Athletic Representative, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota.
1. See American Women, Report of the President's Commission on the Status of
Women (1963); A Matter of Simple Justice, The Report of the President's Task Force on
Women's Rights and Responsibilities (Apr. 1970); Discrimination Against Women: Hearings
on f 805 of HR. 16098 Before the Special Subcomm. on Education of the House Comm. on
Education 6 Labor, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970); L. KANOWlTZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW
(1969); 1969 Handbook on Women Workers, United States Department of Labor, Women's
Bureau Bulletin 294.
2. E.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1964), et. seq.
(hereinafter referred to as Title VII); The Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1963); and Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1978) (hereinafter referred to
as Title IX).
3. Title IX, supra note 2.
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used by athletes who believe that they have been the victims of
gender-based discrimination. The gender-based discrimination
theories will be analyzed using the fourteenth amendment of the
Constitution of the United States and Title IX of the Educational
Amendments of 1972. This paper will also discuss the procedural
issues involved in developing a gender-based discrimination
action.
It is important that both the athlete and counsel understand
the theories described in this article and employ the proper proce-
dures in advancing the case initially. If the proper theories and
procedures are not applied, then the case may be dismissed before
final arguments.
II. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The fourteenth amendment states, "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States .... ,,4 In order to successfully liti-
gate gender discrimination under the fourteenth amendment, a
petitioner must discuss and advocate four areas. First, the peti-
tioner must show that state action exists.5 Second, the petitioner
must address the issue of competition on "mixed" teams, where
physical contact within the athletic event may take place and the
petitioner may have been denied the right to compete because of
physical contact.6 Third, the petitioner must address the issue of
separate but equal opportunities to participate in the athletic
activity.' Fourth, the petitioner must demonstrate that he or she
had a valid property interest.8
A. STATE ACTION
In order for the fourteenth amendment protections to be
afforded to an individual, the rights allegedly violated must have
been violated by the state.9 The claimant must show that differen-
tial treatment is involved. Once state action has been established,
the claimant must then prove that the alleged discriminatory pol-
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D.
Pa. 1981), 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982), 115 F.R.D. 506 (F.D. Pa. 1987), 678 F. Supp. 517 (E.D.
Pa. 1987).
6. LaFler v. Athletic Bd. of Control, 536 F. Supp. 104, 106 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
7. Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 1982).
8. Fluitt v. University of Neb., 489 F. Supp. 1194, 1202 (D. Neb. 1980).
9. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1948); Hawkins v. National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 652 F, Supp. 602, 612 (1987).
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icy does not have a substantial relationship to the governmental
objective to which it is directed. A substantial relationship cannot
be presumed.' °
However, the state itself need not be the actor." If another
party, organization, or institution has acted so that its actions are
considered state actions, then fourteenth amendment protections
will be invoked. 12 The fourteenth amendment seeks to protect
against injustices and against unequal treatment of those individu-
als who should be treated equally. It is not an issue whether one
has the right to participate; what is at issue is that no one is treated
unfairly in an activity provided by the state. A participant can be
treated differently only if there is a substantial basis for the dispa-
rate treatment. 13 There are numerous ways in which a private
entity assumes the role of a state actor. These ways include cor-
10. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1980) (party seeking to uphold a
statute that classifies individuals on the basis of gender must show an exceedingly
persuasive justification for the regulation); Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 273 (1978) (party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of
gender must show an exceedingly persuasive justification of the regulation); Wengler v.
Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1979) (party seeking to uphold a statute that
classifies individuals on the basis of gender must show an exceedingly persuasive
justification of the regulation); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982)
(university limited its enrollment to women, denying qualified men the right to enroll in
the nursing program). See also Bednar v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 531 F.2d 922
(8th Cir. 1976) (regulation prohibiting girls from participating on cross-country teams);
Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973) (regulation against
girls competing on the men's tennis team, cross-country skiing team, and the cross-country
running team); Cape v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n, 563 F.2d 793 (6th Cir.
1977) (different rules required for girl's basketball); Haas v. South Bend Community School
Corp., 289 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. 1972) (regulation denying females the right to participate on
men's golf team); Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975)
(regulation prohibiting girls from playing on boys little league baseball team); Morris v.
Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1973) (regulation prohibiting girls from
competing on the men's tennis team); Clinton v. Nagy, 411 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Ohio 1974)
(regulation prohibiting girls from participating in football); Carnes v. Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic Ass'n, 415 F. Supp. 569 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (regulation prohibiting girls from
playing on baseball teams); Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, 377 F. Supp.
1233 (D. Kan. 1973) (regulation prohibiting girls from participating on cross-country team);
Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977) (regulation prohibiting girls from
participating on high school soccer team); Kelly v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n,
367 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (state interscholastic athletic association policy limited
opportunity for females); Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
Ohio High School Athletic Ass'n, 443 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ohio 1978) (regulation preventing
girls from participating in contact sports); Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic
Athletic Ass'n, 334 A.2d 839 (Pa. 1975) (state interscholastic athletic association prohibited
girls from practicing or participating in any athletic contest with males); Darrin v. Gould,
540 P.2d 882 (Wa. 1975) (regulation prohibiting girls from football competition); and
National Ass'n for Women, Essex County Chapter v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d
33 (N.J. 1974) (regulation prohibiting girls from participating in little league baseball).
11. Howard Univ. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 510 F.2d 213, 217 (1975);
Parish v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 506 F.2d 1028, 1031-32 (1975).
12. Howard University, 510 F.2d at 216-17; Parish, 506 F.2d at 1031.
13. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 721-22 (1961); Brenden v.
Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1297 (1973); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F.
Supp. 517, 524 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
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mandment by the government, 14 encouragement by the govern-
ment,'5 joint efforts in a symbiotic relationship with the
government,'" and assumption of public functions.1
7
It is possible for a genderbased discrimination petitioner to
14. Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 248 (1963).
15. Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 155-56 (1964).
16. Burton, 365 U.S. at 724.
17. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982). One example of the state
requiring a private entity to act in violation of the fourteenth amendment protections
occurred in 1963. Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963). In Peterson, the state
required restaurants to serve food in a racially segregated manner. Id. at 246. The owners
of the restaurant attempted to comply with the state requirement but found it nearly
impossible. Petitioners, the restaurant owners, filed an action under the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 247. The petitioners claimed that since the restaurant was merely
acting in compliance with a state requirement, it was the state that was actually infringing
upon the petitioners' rights. Id. at 249. The Court held that since the state was forcing the
action, it fell under the ambit of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 248.
In 1964, -the Court determined that the state, through legislation or the actions of its
officers, could encourage the activities of private organizations to such an extent that the
private organizations were seen as state actors. Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964). In
Robinson, a Florida statute required restaurants that served members of minority races to
have separate toilet facilities for the minority patrons. Id. at 156. Due to these restrictions
being placed upon restaurant owners, some restaurants limited their patrons to whites only.
Id. Petitioners were members of the minority class who attempted to receive but were
refused service at these restaurants. Id. The Court determined that the Florida statute was
so restrictive that it was the cause of the discrimination. Id. Absent the statute, the
discrimination would not have occurred. Id. Therefore, the petitioners were entitled to
constitutional protection under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 156-57.
Another method by which it has been determined that private actions constitute state
action has been when the relationship between the two actors, the state and the individual,
is so intertwined that a determination as to which actions are state and which are private, is
impossible. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961). In Burton, the
Wilmington Parking Authority leased parking space from a government parking facility.
Id. at 719. The parking facility was located near a government office, resulting in most of its
patrons being government employees. Id. The restaurant was required to follow all of the
limitations placed on government actors, because the location was near the government
facility and the land was granted to the restaurant owners by the government. Therefore,
the fourteenth amendment was applicable and equal protection should have been afforded
to those who were the victims of gender discrimination. Id. at 724.
The last method by which a private entity's actions will be held to the stricter state
action requirements is when the entity is engaged in the exercise of a public function. The
purpose of this last requirement is to restrict the state from freeing itself from the
constitutional limitations simply by delegating its duties to private entities. Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). The
challenged actions cannot be those which a state merely "can" perform, but must be actions
which the state has traditionally performed and which the state has a duty to perform.
Some of these functions include protection of the citizenry, taxation, maintenance of
roadways, and public education.
In 1981, the Supreme Court indicated its intention to examine more closely the
assertions of government involvement in a challenged activity. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991 (1982); Lugar , 457 U.S. 922 (1982); Rendell-Baker , 457 U.S. 830 (1982). In Blum,
Lugar, and Rendell-Baker, the conduct of a private party or organization was examined.
The Court has described a private party or organization that received government support
in the form of revenue as private contractors. These private contractors perform the
government contracts as individuals and the acts of these individuals cannot be attributed
to the government. Thus, in these cases, even though the revenue funding came from the
state government, the Court found no governmental involvement. In other words, while
the government is the "employer," the institution is "private," and its intentional acts
cannot be attributed to the government. Blum, 457 U.S. at 1011-12; Lugar, 457 U.S. at 943;
Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 843.
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claim that an institution, whether it be a state school or a private
school, whether it receive governmental financial assistance or
not, to have acted in violation of the fourteenth amendment of the
Constitution.
B. PHYSICAL CONTACT
Historically, the states have separated males and females in
athletics due to the physical differences between the sexes. 8 This
has been done for two reasons. First, it was, and to some extent
still is, believed that there may be more physical danger to a
female who is competing in a contact sport that includes males
than to a female competing solely against other females.' 9 Second,
there is a belief that males would dominate the female programs
and deny the females the opportunity to participate in the activi-
ties if the males and females were allowed to compete against each
other.2 0
Since 1970, numerous petitioners have challenged the regula-
tions established by state schools and athletic associations that have
regulations prohibiting females from participating in certain
sports. Most of the challenges have been brought by concerned
females who were denied the right to participate 'on mixed
teams.2 ' Courts have concluded that regulations prohibiting
female student-athletes from participating on male teams such as
soccer,2 tennis,2 cross-country skiing,2 4 cross-country running,2
football,26 and baseball are discriminatory.
18. O'Connor v. Board of Educ., 449 U.S. 1301 (1980).
19. Id. at 1305. 9
20. Id. at 1307.
21. See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text
22. Hoover v. Meiklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164, 165 (D. Colo. 1977) (petitioner was a
female student who was prohibited from playing soccer on high school team).
23. See Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973)
(petitioner was a female student who was prohibited from competing in tennis, cross-
country, skiing, and running); Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir.
1973) (prohibiting two high school girls from participating in interscholastic tennis
matches); Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n., 444 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Wis.
1978) (The petitioner was a female student-athlete who wanted to try out for the boy's
tennis team, but state regulation prohibited girls from trying out for boys' teams. The court
found the regulations discriminatory.).
24. Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
25. Id.
26. Force v. Pierce City R-VI School Dist., 570 F. Supp. 1020 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Clinton
v. Nagy, 411 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
27. Carnes v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletics Ass'n, 415 F. Supp. 569 (E.D.
Tenn. 1976); National Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 NJ.
Super 522, 318 A.2d 33, aff'd 67 N.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974); Israel v. West Virginia, 388
S.E.2d 480 (W. Va. 1989). In Israel, a suit was filed by Erin Israel, a female high school
student, against the Secondary Schools Activities Commission (SSAC) for refusing to allow
her to play on the boy's baseball team. Id. at 482. The SSAC rules allowed her to
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Courts quickly point out that there is no constitutional right to
participate in interscholastic athletics.' The only issue the courts
want to examine is whether a program of interscholastic athletics
provided by the school has been administered so that the program
denies equal rights to female students to participate.29
States have promulgated rules prohibiting males from partici-
pating on female teams as well, and actions have been brought by
males who wanted to participate on those teams.30 Such a classifi-
cation is subject to scrutiny under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment to ascertain whether there is a rational
relationship to a valid state purpose.31
In B.C. v. Cumberland Regular School District,z2 the court
ruled that a male student had not been discriminated against, even
though the rules promulgated by the State Interscholastic Athletic
Association prevented him from playing on the girls' field hockey
team.33 The court was convinced that the rules preventing the
boy from playing were promulgated in order to achieve equality
of athletic opportunity for both sexes and to rectify the historical
denial of athletic opportunities for women.34 The court believed
equalization of athletic opportunities was an important govern-
mental objective, and the Association's rules provided an appropri-
ate and proper means of protecting the athletic opportunities of
participate in softball on the girl's softball team. Id. at 482-83. The court determined that
for constitutional purposes, softball and baseball are not substantially equivalent, due to
differences in equipment, size of the playing field, number of players on a team, and the
difference in the skills required to play the two games. Id. at 485. Therefore, the court
stated that since the two games are not substantially equivalent, the SSAC rule violated
petitioner's equal protection rights. Id. The court also rejected the argument that Israel's
claims for relief were moot since she had already graduated from high school. The court
concluded that the SSAC rule would have collateral consequence sufficient to justify the
effort, and that the issue presented a matter of public concern since it involved public
education; also, the court stated that cases like this would never reach the court of appeals,
and should, therefore, be heard. Id. at 483.
28. Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292, 1297 (8th Cir. 1973);
Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ.,472 F.2d 1207, 1209 (6th Cir. 1973); Bucha v. Illinois
High School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp. 69, 73 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
29. Bucha, 351 F. Supp. at 72.
30. Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 818 (1983); Petrie v. Illinois High School Athletic Ass'n, 75 11. App. 3d 980, 394
N.E.2d 855 (1979); Mularadelis v. Haldane Central School Bd., 74 A.D..2d 248,427 N.Y.S.2d
458 (1980) (promulgated rules were upheld). The courts, in the above cited cases, relied
upon the arguments that regulations denying or prohibiting boys from participating on
girl's teams were substantially related to the important governmental interests in
promoting overall equality of athletic opportunity and in redressing past discrimination
against women in athletics.
31. Morris, 472 F.2d at 1209.
32. 220 N.J. Super. 214, 531 A.2d 1059 (1987).
33. B.C. v. Cumberland Reg. School Dist., 220 N.J. Super. 214,_, 531 A.2d 1059, 1063-
64 (1987).
34. Id. at -, 531 A.2d at 1065.
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female students in the educational system."z
The courts have had more difficulty in ruling on actions where
the male student-athlete alleges discrimination.3 6 In this area, the
Supreme Court has held that gender-based classifications can with-
stand a constitutional challenge under the fourteenth amendment
where the actual purpose of the gender-based regulation or rule
was to compensate for past discrimination.37
If an institution demonstrates that there is potential harm to
the female student-athletes, or, arguably, to the male student-ath-
letes, due to the nature of the contact sport in question, it will be
held constitutional to limit participation in that sport. The state
must show the primary concern is for the average differences
between the sexes, and that the state is concerned for the health
and safety of the participants. 39 The factors used to justify the
harm, which the state must allege and prove, are safety, intimida-
tion and displacement.40 In order to prevail on a constitutional
claim of gender discrimination, the plaintiff must prove that the
state action is involved in the denial of an application to
compete.41
C. SEPARATE BUT EQUAL
In 1979, the parents of two collegiate female basketball play-
ers brought suit against Oregon State University for failure to pro-
vide equality between the men's and women's athletic
programs.42 The petitioners contended that there were verifiable
instances of inequality in the two sports programs.4 3
35. Id. The courts have had more difficulty in ruling on these actions. In this area, the
Supreme Court has held that sex-based classification can withstand a constitutional
challenge under the fourteenth amendment where the actual purpose of the gender-based
rule is to compensate for past discrimination. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 318 (1977).
36. B.C., 220 N.J. Super. at _ 531 A.2d at 1066; Califano, 430 U.S. at 318.
37. Id.
38. LaFler v. Athletic Bd. of Control, 536 F. Supp. 104, 106 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
39. B.C., 220 NJ. Super. at _, 531 A.2d at 1067.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Aiken v. Lieuallen, 39 Or. App. 779, -, 593 P.2d 1243, 1244 (1979). Oregon State
University provided both a men's athletic program and a women's program. Id. at 1246.
Each program had its own staff and its own budget. Id. The programs did not offer
identical sports activities. Id.
43. Id. at 1251. The court found disparity between the men's and the women's
programs based upon evidence indicating that the men's program had a budget nearly 200
percent larger than the women's program. The court stated that in making a
determination as to whether the athletic programs for men and women were disparate in
their treatments of athletes, the factfinder could consider the revenue-generating ability of
a sport, the level of interest and ability of the participants, the nature of transportation
provided, the amounts paid to those individuals officiating the contest, the level of coaching
provided, and the university's commitment to competitive athletic programs. Id. at 1248-
51. The court emphasized that athletic expenditures need not be equal, but the pattern of
2331991]
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Prior to addressing the specific issues, the court emphasized
that an institution can provide separate programs for men and
women.4 4  The court stated that programs must exist for both
sexes, and there must be an opportunity for both genders to par-
ticipate in intercollegiate athletics.45 The issue of separateness
was not the question; the issue of equality was.46
expenditures must not result in a disparate effect on opportunity. Id. at 1245. The Oregon
regulations were fashioned after the federal regulations implementing Title IX of the
Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681. Id. One of the key definitions is that
which defines discrimination as "any act that unreasonably differentiates treatment,
intended or unintended, or any act that is fair in form but discriminatory in operation,
either of which is based on age, handicap, national origin, race, marital status, religion, or
sex." OR. REv. STAT. 659.150(1) (1975) (emphasis added). In Aiken, the court determined
that there was no gender discrimination, due to the fact that the disparities between the
two programs were reasonable. Id. at 1251. For similar discussions, see Haffer v. Temple
Univ., 688 F.2d 14 (3rd Cir. 1982) (a landmark case in that the U.S. Supreme Court had
heard it before); Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3rd Cir. 1982), aff'd 465 U.S. 555
(1984) and again after the decision in Grove City, allowing the petitioners in Haffer to
amend their complaint to raise the federal and state issues. In Haffer's original complaint,
the petitioners based their claim upon Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20
U.S.C. § 1681 (1978). Grove City held that the institution itself must be the program
receiving assistance, and that grants by some of the college students did not trigger
institution-wide coverage. Grove City, 687 F.2d at 691. Therefore, if the program did not
receive federal money, the regulations of Title IX did not apply to that program. Id. at 692.
Since the Grove City decision, the federal government enacted the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988). In this Act, Congress
explicitly intended "to reaffirm pre-Grove City" by applying federal antidiscrimination laws
and overturn the decision by the Supreme Court in Grove City. The Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987 states that all programs and activities of an institution are now
subject to federal antidiscrimination laws if any federal aid is received by the institution in
any one of its programs or activities. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-
259, 102 Stat. 28, Legislative History at 4 (1988).
See also Blair v. Washington State Univ., 108 Wash. 2d 558, 740 P.2d 1379 (1987). In
Blair, evidence showed that in the 1980-81 school year, the total funding available to the
men's athletic programs was $3,017,692, whereas the women's athletic program in that
year received only $689,757. Id. at 561, 740 P.2d at 1381. This equaled 23% of the men's
funding. When the factors were evaluated, the defendants argued that football should be
excluded from the factoring, since it was the primary revenue-generating sport. Id. at 564,
740 P.2d at 1382. The court denied this argument. Id. at 569, 740 P.2d at 1385. The court
observed the evidence presented and concluded that the defendants "had 'acted, or failed
to act, in the operation of the University's intercollegiate athletic programs in a manner
that resulted in discriminatory treatment of females . I..' Id. at 561, 740 P.2d at 1381.
The court, quoting the trial court memorandum stated, after examining the evidence that
"'[tlhe message came through loud and clear, women's teams [at Washington State] were
low priority."' Id. The court found other specific areas of inequality and discrepancies
including tutoring, training table privileges, transportation, and officiating. Id.
44. Aiken v. Lieuallen, 39 Or. App. 779, -., 593 P.2d 1243, 1245 (1979) (the court cited
Oregon statutes stating that only "unreasonablie] differentiat[ion]" in treatment is
discrimination),
45. Id.
46. Id. at -, 593 P.2d at 1249-51. The specific issues which were addressed by the
court in this case were:
1. Alleged unreasonable inequality of transportation;
2. Alleged unreasonable inequality and inferior officiating;
3. Alleged unreasonable disparity in coaching staffs;
4. Alleged inequality of the entire competitive athletic program for men and
women.
Id. The court examined the following areas:
1. Appropriateness of equipment and supplies;
234
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The court stated that the revenue-producing capability of the
two sports programs was a "valid criterion" to be considered in
examining the distinctions between the programs. 47 The court
recognized that athletic programs are revenue-producing endeav-
ors, and that the income generated from each individual sport
affects the financial expenditures upon that program.48 Therefore,
a sport that provides a larger income to the institution may have a
larger budget and more "extras."' 49 However, the court empha-
sized that the discrepancies must have some actual basis in fact.5 °
For example, if the men's basketball program is actually being
funded at an amount ten times greater than the women's basket-
ball program, the income from the men's basketball program
should be approximately ten times larger than the income from
the women's program. While the numbers do not have to match
exactly, any disparity must be reasonable. 5' The petitioner should
allege that the revenue-generating ability of a sport is not static.52
As the sport emerges from the institution, if the university is to be
reasonable in its funding, the university must take into account not
only the present revenue-generating capabilities, but they must
also consider the future revenue-generating capabilities.5 " The
petitioners should argue that increased funding to a program
would increase the revenue-generating capabilities. 4 The peti-
tioner should prepare for the court an economic analysis of the
existing factors, showing that it takes money to make money.55
In determining whether the university or institution's action
results in a disparate effect upon one sex over the other and is,
therefore, unreasonable, one must examine the amount of money
that is budgeted for various women's sports as compared to the
2. Games and practice schedules;
3. Travel and per diem allowances;
4. Opportunity for coaching and academic tutoring;
5. Coaches and tutors;
6. Locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
7. Medical and training services;
8. Housing and dining facilities and services; and
9. Publicity.
Id.
47. Id. at 593 P.2d at 1248-49.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 593 P.2d at 1251.
50. Id. at -, 593 P.2d at 1248-49.
51. Id. at 593 P.2d at 1251.
52. Id. at -, 593 P.2d at 1249.
53. ld.
54. Id.
55. See Aiken, 39 Or. App. at -, 593 P.2d at 1251.
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money that is budgeted for men's sports.' Also, the petitioner
should compare the money spent on equipment, facilities, officiat-
ing and uniforms for both programs. In some instances, these
differences may be so glaring that no other evidence is necessary
to show that disparate treatment exists between programs.5 8
D. PROPERTY INTEREST
At the inception of a collegiate athletic career, the student-
athlete has no constitutional right to participate in or receive
grant-in-aid funding for collegiate athletics.59 However, as factors
are introduced into the student-athlete's career, the property right
to participate may be granted.60 Property interests are created by
existing rules or understandings stemming from an independent
source, such as state law, and the dimensions of the interests are
defined similarly."' Property rights can be created by contract. 2
Until such property interest is specifically granted, it does not
exist, and due process protections are not invoked.' However,
once such property interest is granted, recipients may not be
deprived of it without due process.6
Courts have noted that regulations and documentation
regarding student athletic scholarships can give rise to a property
interest on the part of the student-athlete.6 5 Courts have held that
the right to be eligible to participate in college athletics is a prop-
erty right of present economic value.6 Because some college ath-
letes receive scholarships of value to engage in collegiate athletics,
there is a property right of present economic value. 67 In high
school athletics there are no scholarships, and at some colleges
(especially NCAA Division III) there are no scholarships, and thus,
56. Id. at -, 593 P.2d at 1251.
57. Id.
58. Id. at -. 593 P.2d at 1251 n. 10.
59. Fluitt v. the University of Neb., 489 F. Supp. 1194, 1202-03 (D. Neb. 1980); But cf.
Behagen v. Intercollegiate Conference of Faculty Representatives, 346 F. Supp. 602, 604
(D. Minn. 1972) (Behagen stated that an education is of such "substantial importance" that it
requires some constitutional protection.). See also Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v.
N.C.A.A., 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977) (court specifically declined to find a property interest
in intercollegiate basketball participation despite the fact that the lower court had found
such a property interest).
60. Parish v. N.C.A.A., 506 F.2d 1028, 1034 (5th Cir. 1975); Colorado Seminary v.
N.C.A.A., 417 F. Supp. 885, 895 (D. Colo. 1976).
61. Fluitt, 489 F. Supp. at 1202.
62. See Fluitt, 489 F. Supp. at 1202-03 n. 4.
63. Id. at 1203.
64. J. NOWARK, B. ROTUNDA AND J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, chap. 15 at 530
(2d. ed. 1983).
65. Boyd v. Board of Directors of McGehee School Dist., 612 F. Supp. 86, 93 (1985).
66. Gulf South Conference v. Boyd, 369 So. 2d 553 (1979).
67. Id. at 556.
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no right to participate.' However, if a student-athlete can show a
direct link between participation and a tangible property interest,
it is conceivable that a court would find that a property interest is
present in the mere participation in collegiate athletics.
D. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CONCLUSION
The injunction is a remedy commonly used by petitioners
when alleging a constitutional violation of their fourteenth amend-
ment rights.69 The petitioner may seek either an ex parte tempo-
rary restraining order (TRO) or a preliminary injuntion.7 °
The preliminary injunction is granted prior to a determina-
tion on the merits of the actual action.71 Therefore, the petitioner
must show that none of the less drastic provisional remedies pro-
vide an acceptable alternative, and that irreparable injury will
occur if the temporary restraining order or temporary injuncton is
not granted.72
The courts will then balance the relative harm to each party
before granting the injunction.73 When the petitioner believes
that immediate relief is essential, a court will more often grant a
temporary restraining order.7 4 In order to obtain this ex parte
order, the petitioner must meet a number of special conditions.75
The temporary restraining order generally is in effect for a rela-
tively short time or until a hearing is held on plaintiff's request for
a preliminary injunction.76 The factors a court considers before
granting a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction
are: 1) Is there an adequate legal remedy available which is less
drastic? 2) Aie there difficulties of enforcement and administra-
tion of the order? 3) Will the injunction be effective? 4) Is there
irreparable harm? 5) Does the applicant have "clean hands," or is
the applicant guilty of laches? and 6) Will the applicant prevail at
the formal hearing?
77
If it is determined that an institution is in violation of a stu-
68. See id.
69. Saint v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 684 F. Supp. 626 (D. Neb. 1988); Reed v.
Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972); FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b).
70. Saint, 684 F. Supp. at 628; Reed, 341 F. Supp. at 261.




74. Saint, 684 F. Supp. at 629.
75. Id.
76. COUND supra note 71, at 975; FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
77. COUND supra note 71, at 976; Saint, 684 F. Supp. at 629; Reed, 341 F. Supp. at 263-
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dent-athlete's fourteenth amendment rights, that student may
seek an injunction to restrain the discriminatory action from con-
tinuing. 8  An injunction may be brought to stay any harmful
action while the primary action is pending.71 The court then
reviews the entire case and determines if discriminatory action
exists. Often, the court requires the institution to provide separate
but equal sports programs.8 ° Courts have also awarded damages
to the female student-athletes who have been injured by the
discrimination.8 '
III. TITLE IX
Title IX, which has been the basis of many gender discrimina-
tion suits against collegiate institutions by female student-athletes,
states, "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activ-
ity receiving Federal financial assistance .... The purpose of
Title IX was to eliminate gender discrimination in numerous set-
tings, one of which was coeducational programs.'
Title IX was more specifically tied to high school athletic pro-
grams in 1973, when the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit ruled on Brenden v. Independent School Dis-
tricts, 4 a case involving two female high school student-athletes.85
In Brenden, the plaintiffs sought an injunction barring their high
schools from refusing to permit them to participate on the tennis,
cross-country skiing, and running teams and to further bar the
Minnesota State High School League from imposing any sanctions
78. Fluitt, 489 F. Supp. at 1201; Saint, 684 F. Supp. at 628-29; Reed, 341 F. Supp. at
262-63;
79. See Saint, 684 F. Supp at 630.
80. Id.
81. See generally Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Fluitt, 489
F. Supp. 1194 (D. Neb. 1980). In order to prevail on a constitutional claim of discrimination
based on the fourteenth amendment, a claimant must allege and prove that state action is
involved. Haffer, 678 F. Supp. at 524; Bennet, 525 F. Supp. at 79. The party seeking to
uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their gender "'must carry the
burden of showing an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification."' Haffer,
678 F. Supp. at 524. This "'burden is met ... by showing ... that the classification serves
"important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed" are
"substantially related to the achievement of those objectives .... "... Id. In addition, in
order to prevail in a gender-based law suit the injured party must allege and prove a
property interest. Fluitt, 489 F. Supp. at 1202.
82. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1978).
83. Plascik v. Cleveland Museum of Art, 426 F. Supp. 779, 781 n. 1 (D.C. Ohio 1977).
84. 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
85. Brenden v. Independent School Dist. 742, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
238 [Vol. 67:227
GENDER DISCRIMINATION
upon their high schools due to their participation.W
In Brenden, the high schools that the plaintiffs attended had
accepted and followed a rule prohibiting the plaintiffs from partic-
ipating on their respective teams.8 7 The rule specifically barred
females from participating against males in any high school inter-
scholastic athletic activity.8 The court granted the plaintiffs'
request for an injunction, but specified that numerous questions
remained unanswered at the time. 9
The Brenden court did not address the issue of whether the
schools could fulfill their responsibilities under Title IX by provid-
ing separate but equal facilities for females in interscholastic ath-
letics, due to the fact that no teams for females existed in the
sports involved. Also, the court did not address the issue of
whether the institution would be justified in precluding females
from competing with males in contact sports, because both sports
involved were intrinsically noncontact sports. In later cases, courts
would address these questions and other questions similar to these
in order to analyze the Title IX issues.90
Title IX was applied to intercollegiate athletic programs in
1981.91 In Haffer v. Temple University, numerous female student-
athletes brought an action on behalf of all of the female student-
athletes at Temple University.92 They claimed that the institution
offered disparate opportunities to compete in intercollegiate ath-
letics, disparate financing of the men's and women's athletic pro-
grams, and disparate allocation of financial aid to male and female
student-athletes.9 3
In addition to the fourteenth amendment argument, the peti-
tioners claimed that the distribution of financial aid violated Title
IX.94 The court explained that, although an institution of higher
education is not as inherently tied to the state as a secondary
school, a college that receives financial aid from the state or fed-
eral government is acting in concert with the government in its
actions, and therefore, Title IX applies to the actions of the





90. See cases cited supra note 10.
91. Haffer v. Temple Univ., 524 F. Supp. 531, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14, 15 (3rd Cir. 1982).
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institution.95
In 1984, the Supreme Court heard Grove City v. Bell,9 6 a
landmark case which added conditions to a 1982 decision in a
Texas case.97 In Grove City, the Court limited the bond between
the government and the institution.98 The Court found that since
the financial aid itself had no discriminatory impact, and the finan-
cial aid could not be logically and naturally tied to the athletic pro-
gram, the institution was not in violation of Title IX.99 Once Grove
City v. Bell was decided, the appeals of Haffer and Bennett v. West
Texas State University 1o became significant. Courts now had a
Supreme Court action upon which to base decisions regarding
Title IX claims of student athletes.
This theory of no discriminatory impact was repeated in Ben-
nett, in 1986.101 Six female student-athletes contended that West
Texas State University denied them equal opportunity to partici-
pate in intercollegiate athletics. 10 2 The female athletes contended
that the discrimination was due to a disproportionate amount of
spending between the men's athletic programs and the women's
athletic programs. 0 3 The court stated that the athletic program of
the institution did not fall under Title IX scrutiny, because the ath-
letic program itself was not a direct recipient of federal funding.1
0 4
Based upon Grove City, the court found that indirect aid which
was awarded to the institution but not to the specific program was
not enough contact to bring the athletic program within the scope
of Title IX. 1
0 5
However, in 1988, the United States Congress passed the Civil
Rights Restoration Act.' ° 6 Using this Act, Congress broadened the
use of Title IX in gender discrimination claims against institutions
based upon the intercollegiate athletic program.
10 7
95. Id. at 16.
96. 465 U.S. 555 (1984), afftg, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982).
97. Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984), aff'g, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1982).
98. Id. at 573.
99. Haffer, 678 F. Supp. at 522.
100. 799 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1986).
101. Bennett v. West Tex. State Univ., 799 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1986).
102. Id. at 156.
103. Id. at 156-57.
104. Id. at 157-58.
105. Id. at 159.
106. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
107. Id. When the federal legislators enacted Public Law Number 100-259, they
intended to reaffirm "pre-Grove City" by applying federal antidiscriminatory laws.
Congress intended to overturn the Grove City decision. The Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987 states that all programs and activities of an institution are subject to federal anti-




Following passage of the Civil Rights Restoration Act, the
petitioner in Haffer was granted a motion for reconsideration.108
The court determined that the relationship between the financial
aid office, which does receive federal funds, and the athletic schol-
arships, which are administered through the financial aid office,
was a sufficient interconnection, thus placing an institution within
the protections of Title IX. 1" 9 The athletic scholarships allow the
institution to administer the federal funds in a way that the institu-
tion had previously been unable to do.'10 The athletic scholarships
had direct impact upon the financial aid office, and the financial
aid office had direct control over the federal funds."' The athletic
scholarships, specifically the administration of them, had a direct
impact on the use of the federal funds.' 12 Therefore, petitioners
could sue based upon a Title IX claim.1
3
If a petitioner successfully challenges an institution based
upon a Title IX claim, the same recourse exists as under a success-
ful fourteenth amendment claim. However, under a Title IX
claim, the petitioner has one additional claim for relief-the suc-
cessful petitioner may petition the court for the withholding of
federal funds from the institution."14 The minor impact upon the
petitioner's life is the withholding of the funds.
The ability to petition for withholding of federal funds can be
an important tool in the negotiating process in the early stages of a
Title IX case. A petitioner may seek an injunction preventing the
appropriation of federal funds to an institution." 5 The petitioner
needs to demonstrate that there is a significant likelihood of win-
ning the case, and that the petitioner, or others similarly situated,
will be injured if the federal funds are distributed." 6 An institu-
tion faced with the lack of federal funds is more likely to negotiate
with the petitioner than an institution that is merely required to
allow the student-athlete to participate.
CONCLUSION
Prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Restoration Act in
1988, victims of gender-based discrimination relied primarily
108. Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
109. Id. at 537-38.
110. Id. at 538.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Haffer, 678 F. Supp. at 539-40.
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upon a constitutional challenge or violation of the fourteenth
amendment. Title IX challenges were not too successful, and basi-
cally the results were the same in either challenge. However,
when the Title IX challenge was successful, the petitioner could
pray for federal financial aid to be withheld as one form of relief.
This was not a relief granted in the constitutional challenge.
To be successful, a petitioner has to include all of the remedies
available in order to avoid a summary judgment decision by a
judge who is reluctant to interfere in the educational process.
Also, judges view intercollegiate or athletic programs as an inte-
gral part of a student-athlete education.
It is impossible to predict what the next decade may hold for
those individuals who choose to participate in athletic endeavors
that have traditionally been for the "other" gender. Some male
student-athletes are choosing to compete in traditionally female-
dominated sports, whereas female student-athletes are choosing
the male-dominated sports. One cannot predict, but it is a fact
that athletic programs will be closely monitored in the future.
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